Consider the statement below:

“The Catholic Church, with one consent, has also ever held and does hold that there is a two-fold order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and also in object; in principle, because our knowledge, in the one, is by natural reason, and, in the other, is by Divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed, for our belief, mysteries hidden in God, which, unless Divinely-revealed, cannot be known.”

– 1st Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution of the Catholic Faith, IV.1

According to the statement, the 1st Vatican Council affirmed that human knowledge has two distinct “orders”. For the first, they asserted that by natural reason man can gain knowledge of natural things, and for the second, that by supernatural revelation man can know the “mysteries hidden in God”. Embedded in this assertion is the implicit denial that man needs no revelation from God to decipher natural, reasoned things, which is where problems arise.

In my view, there are at least three problems with the council’s formulation of natural revelation. The first is the epistemological problem of detaching natural revelation from divine revelation. The second is the implication of man’s epistemological autonomy. And the third is the seeming disregard for Scripture’s categorical claims regarding the source of all human knowledge. I’ll address each briefly below.

First, while it is true that without God’s divine revelation man is hopeless to know even an iota of his mysterious nature or will, it cannot be true that either man’s thinking or rationale are detached from the revelation of God. The council was right to note that reason is a worthy means to understand natural revelation, but they were incorrect—either by their phrasing or in their conclusions—that reason can operate in any capacity outside the revelatory work of God. Natural revelation and supernatural revelation work jointly as God’s full revelation; both are divine and necessary to know God. The council would likely not deny this, but their formulation of reason as done somehow insulated from, or autonomous of, God’s divine revelation is an epistemological error. We cannot know supernaturally unless we also know naturally; the natural is the canvas upon which the supernatural ensues. There is no incarnate Christ without a natural world within which he can walk and act, and die and be resurrected.

The second problem raised by the council’s formulation of natural revelation is that it implies human autonomy of reason. By virtue of engaging in the very acts of thinking and reasoning, man is wading into the waters of God’s revelation through creation. Per Van Til, by necessity all humanity thinks God’s thoughts after him, as we are creatures deriving all knowledge from him and mimicking him in our capacities for thought and reason. Reason does not exist outside of God, as if to be an arbiter of knowledge and truth aside from what he has chosen to reveal. As Dr. Garner stated, “We live in His created world and there is nothing that is a-theological or pre-theological” (Lecture on First Things and Epistemology, Pt. 1). Reason is reasonable because God created it as such, and the very processes of thought we deploy are under his governance and care. There can be no foundation of human knowledge outside of God’s perview and thus, all knowledge is inherently theological, or to put it another way, even the human ability to reason is revelatory.

To assert that anything can be truly known that is not divinely revealed is to assert that natural revelation is aside and separate from God’s revelation. But it cannot be. God is himself the essential principle—a priori—of human thought. Christians view reason as embedded in the nature and character of God, while non-Christians view reason as over and above him. Refusing to acknowledge God’s supremacy over all reality is to make man autonomous, thus elevating the creature to creator status. Man thinks proximately what God thought ultimately, and the 1st Vatican Council’s apparent conclusion that divine revelation starts only with the supernatural contradicts that reality.

The third and final problem with the 1st Vatican Council’s formulation of natural revelation is that it is inconsistent with biblical categories of knowledge. Biblically, all knowledge starts with the fear of the Lord (Proverbs 1:7). The root of human thought is our relationship to God as creatures to our Creator. We think because God thought first and we are creatures created in his image. And, as Dr. Garner articulated, “Our ability to think clearly begins with our posture toward God” (Lecture on First Things and Epistemology, Pt. 1). We cannot think accurately if our thinking ignores the reality of our relationship to God, which leads to the next categorical claim of the Bible: understanding requires trust in God as God (Proverbs 3:5–6). While pride and self-reliance will result in confusion, humility and reliance upon God are the path to true knowledge. Further, and finally for the sake of this treatment, biblical knowledge does not come from within, it is received from above. “The Lord gives wisdom; from his mouth come knowledge and understanding” (Proverbs 2:6). Paul writes, “In [Christ] are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Colossians 2:3) and James writes, “If any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask God, who gives generously to all without reproach, and it will be given him” (James 1:5). Biblically, knowledge and understanding cannot originate in man, but all knowledge is from God and must be thought of as such.

The 1st Vatican Council’s statement, taken at face value, seems to present significant problems with regard to biblical epistemology. They would do well to root their theology of natural revelation in the Divine alongside the supernatural; doing so would result in a more robust, consistent, and biblical Christian epistemology and theology of revelation.